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Introduction
1 The year is  2018,  twelve months or  so before India’s  general  elections and the BJP
(Bharatiya  Janata  Party)  leader  Narendra  Modi’s  bid  for  a  second  term  as  Prime
Minister. On March 13th, Dalmia Bharat Limited, an industrial group known primarily
for Dalmia Cement, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry
of  Tourism,  the Ministry  of  Culture and the Archeological  Survey of  India  (ASI)  by
which the corporation formally  “adopted” the Mughal Red Fort  of  Delhi  under the
national  “Adopt a Heritage” scheme and committed to provide basic  amenities  and
complete  operation  and  maintenance  of  this  UNESCO  World  Heritage  Site  for  a
minimum duration of five years.1 On July 27th, the tidy sum of Rupees 1,452 lakhs2 (€
1,6M) was sanctioned for the development of a “spiritual circuit” in the state of Uttar
Pradesh  (UP)  under  the  aegis  of  another  national  heritage  program  known  as  the
“Swadesh Darshan Scheme.”3 Still later that year, on October 16th, the BJP government
of  UP  decided  to  rename  the  city  of  Allahabad,  Prayagraj,  “a  twenty-first  century
Hindutva invention” meant  to  erase  the Mughal  past  of  the city  and to  restore  its
primal identity as a major Hindu pilgrimage center.4 By the end of that same month, on
the  31st,  Narendra  Modi  inaugurated  with  great  pomp  a  colossal  statue  of  Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel (d. 1950), a senior figure of the movement for independence and of
the Congress Party whom the Hindu right is currently refurbishing as one of its own,
not the least because of the Gujarati origins he shares with N. Modi.
2 Every one of the above-listed public acts obviously relates to the paradigmatic idea of
“heritage,” a term referring first and foremost to “any relict physical surviving from
the past” but that extends to include “all accumulated cultural and artistic productivity
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(…)  whether  produced in  the past  or  currently”  (Ashworth and Tunbridge 1996:1–2,
emphasis  mine).  When  considered  together,  these  decisions—whether  taken  at  the
federal  or  state  level—reveal  the  three  most  salient  features  of  Hindutva  heritage
politics  and  policies.  First  is  the  state’s  reluctance  to  fulfill  its  traditional  role  of
guardian  of  the  nation’s  built landscape  and  the  concomitant  resort  to  neo-liberal
outsourcing strategies to fill in the gap. Second is a strong sectarian bias at work in the
shrinking state-sponsored projects of heritage management and development; a similar
prejudice  also  underpins  a  large-scale  policy  of  renaming  that  ultimately  aims  at
emphasizing the Hinduness of India’s public space and at expurgating from the latter
all  material  traces  related  to  the  pluri-secular  presence  of  non-Hindus  (especially
Muslims)  in  the  subcontinent.  Third  is  a  strong  appetite  for  building  new  and
exorbitant heritage creations, thus recklessly adding to the 3,686 ancient monuments
and  archaeological  sites  the  state  (through  the  Archeological  Survey  of  India)  is
increasingly unable to protect. 
3 A recent essay by Supriya Gandhi, a historian of the Mughal empire, helps to make
sense of the blatant contradictions at work in the Hindu right’s thinking about, and
management  of,  Indian  material  culture,  past  and  present.  Reviewing  some  of  the
“events”  mentioned above,  she eloquently  writes:  “In India,  the authoritarian state
steadily works to reshape public space by claiming the right to  destroy,  preserve and
build” (Gandhi 2020,  emphasis  mine).  As the present essay will  argue,  “to preserve,
build and destroy” is actually an especially fitting motto to describe the BJP’s heritage
ideology  and  practices;  it  is  also  a  very  useful  heuristic  lens  to  disentangle  the
deceptively  inconsistent  threads  adding  up to  form the  new Hindu Rashtra  (Hindu
nation)’s patrimonial policy and to expose the latter in plain view.
 
The BJP preservation of India’s built heritage: an
unsavory blend of sectarian bias and neo-liberalism
4 The first section of this essay is concerned with Hindutva-inspired policies of heritage
conservation and promotion through a discussion of two national programs devised
and implemented  by  the  BJP  after  it  won the  2014  general  elections:  the  Swadesh
Darshan Scheme (henceforth SDS) and the Adopt a Heritage scheme (henceforth AAH).
5 The former was officially launched in January 2015 by the Ministry of Tourism under
the aegis of the Government of India that also provides most of its funding. Its twofold
objective is, in short, to use the tourism sector to boost infrastructure and economic
development and “to promote cultural and heritage value of the country” through the
creation of fifteen “themed routes” at regional and national levels.5 If we are to believe
the banner adorning the pages of the official website of the scheme (figure 1) and the
communication strategy underlying it,  every  facet  of  India’s  rich built  architecture
seems at first sight to be eligible for the institution of a themed route. 
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Figure 1: The Swadesh Darshan Scheme website banner, © Ministry of Tourism, Government of
India
Source: www.swadeshdarshan.gov.in
6 In  addition  to  the  world-famous  Mughal  Taj  Mahal  situated  at  the  center,  it  also
features the Qutb Minar (to the right), the “victory tower” built by Delhi sultans in the
late twelfth-thirteenth century and, on the left, the India Gate of Delhi designed by the
British architect Edwin Lutyens (d. 1944),  more generally known for his planning of
New Delhi. How come, one wonders, the banner gives pride of place to monumental
artifacts  commissioned  by  historical  Muslim  and  Christian  leaders  (to  employ  the
Hindutva  idiom)—i.e.  members  of  two  non-Hindu  minorities  that  are  today  daily
vilified by the majoritarian Hindu state the Sangh Parivar is building—but includes no
material  vestige  of  the  relentlessly  glorified  Hindu  past?  Can  the  “Swadesh”
(homeland) delineated by an officially BJP-sponsored program possibly diverge from
the  dogma  formulated  by  V.  D.  Savarkar  (d. 1966),  Hindutva’s  founding  father,
according to which India is the land of Hindus alone?6 
7 A close look at the list of the themed routes and their itineraries suffices to dispel any
doubt, or hope. 
8 Table 1: Overview of the Swadesh Darshan Scheme 
Official  circuit
name
Number  of  sub-
circuits
Total  of  funding
sanctioned
(INR Lakhs)
Chronology  of  funding
approval
Buddhist 6 37 319,21 July 2016-June 2018
Coastal 10 77 298,54 March 2015-June 2017
Desert 1 6 396,37 Sept 2015
Eco 6 49 050,71 Sept. 2015-August 2018
Heritage 10 85 420,96 Sept. 2016-August 2018
Himalayan 7 63 934,62 June 2016-March 2017
Krishna 2 18 879,69 September 2016
North-East 10 85 609,22 March 2015-January 2019
Ramayana 2 20 275,36 Sept. 2016-Sept. 2017
Rural 2 12 502,4 June 2017-Sept 2018
Spiritual 13 76 067,22 July 2016-January 2019
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Sufi 0 0 w/o
Tirthankar 0 0 w/o
Tribal 4 38 011,65 November 2015-Sept. 2016








9 As shown by the above table compiled on the basis on the data available on its official
website, the SDS does exactly the opposite of what its banners seems to advertise. 30.5%
of  the  sub-circuits  detailed  specifically  aim  at  promoting  and  developing  Hindu
religious tourism and represent 26% of the total funding. Although a Sufi themed route
is publicized as “one of the key development thrusts of the Ministry of Tourism,” the
webpage  dedicated  to  it  remains  significantly  empty,7 pointing  to  the  lack  of  any
concrete plan of development (the same holds true for the Jain-oriented Tirtankhar
circuit). Furthermore, the Spiritual themed route, which one could have expected to
include sites of the many spiritual traditions present in India (isn’t Sufism a form of
spirituality?),  blatantly ignores non-Hindu shrines.  The tiny number of  sites  (eight)
connected with Islamic traditions that are mentioned in the description of the seventy-
five sub-themed routes reflects a similar sectarian bias and disregard for non-Hindu
heritage.8 
10 Nor  is  the  SDS’s  disregard  for  non-Hindu  heritage  an  isolated  exception  where
Hindutva-inspired plans for patrimonial conservation and promotion are concerned.
Among  many  other  recent  examples,  only  a  handful  can  be  mentioned  here:  the
campaign of restoration focusing on sites associated with Hindu mythology conducted
in Haryana by Jagmohan, an admittedly complex political figure, during his 2001-2004
mandate  as  Union  Cabinet  Minister  for  Tourism  and  Culture;9 or  the  Vishwanath
Corridor in Varanasi (Kumar 2019), a pet project of N. Modi supported by the UP Chief
Minister Yogi Adityanath aiming at facilitating the devotees’ access from the Ganga
ghats to the Shiva temple through the undiscriminating clearance of the surrounding
land (Kumar 2019). These various instances obviously all point in the same direction:
the deliberate marginalization of Indian vestiges associated with Islamic and Christian
cultures in state-funded heritage conservation and promotion projects. As shown below
by  the  second  case  study,  the  BJP’s  strategy  markedly  differs  when  it  comes  to
auctioning pieces of the national patrimony.
11 The administrative tool through which such transactions are currently taking place is
called the “Adopt a Heritage” (AAH) scheme. Partaking of the neo-liberal politics that
constitute yet another hallmark of  Hindutva governance,  the program (launched in
2017) invites private and public sector companies and individuals (thence nicknamed
Monument  Mitras or  “friends”)  to  adopt  heritage sites  and use their  CSR (Corporate
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Social  Responsibility)  funds  for  the  upkeep and maintenance  of  the  latter,  thereby
substituting for the state in its patrimonial duty.10 True, the privatization of heritage
conservation has been steadily growing across various nation-states for several decades
now:  it  has  become  common  practice  in  Europe,  as  exemplified  of  late  by  the
controversial  “Loto Mission Patrimoine” (akin to the British National Lottery Heritage
Fund)  sanctioned  by  the  French  government  of  Emmanuel  Macron  in  2017  and
supervised  by  the  notoriously  royalist  media  figure  and  self-proclaimed  historian
Stéphane Bern.11 There also have been precedents in India, dating back to a time when
the BJP was not in power at the federal level (Sankaran 2019:38). However, the recent
acceleration of this process through the AAH program takes on an added dimension in
the context of Hindu Rashtra building.
12 Much as in the case of the SDS, a rapid comparative analysis of the AAH’s marketing
strategy and implementation is especially instructive. As opposed to the SDS banner,
the AAH logo (figure 2) seems to negate the very existence of the Indo-Islamic element
within Indian heritage.
 
Figure 2: Official logo of the “Adopt a Heritage” scheme, © Ministry of Tourism, Government of India
Source: https://www.adoptaheritage.in/
13 Significantly, the three structures selected to symbolize the nation’s patrimony are a
South  Indian  Gopuram  temple  similar  to  Madurai’s  Meenakshi  temple  (left),  the
colonial  Gateway  of  India  in  Mumbai  (center),  and  a  Sikh  gurdwara  akin  to  the
Gurdwara Bangla Sahib of Delhi (right). As if to emphasize the message conveyed by the
image, the motto placed under the name of the program states: “Your own heritage,
your  own  identity”  (aapni  dharohar,  aapni  pahachaan).  If  one  follows  the  program’s
catchphrase, the lack of reference to the Islamic component of Indian heritage in the
logo directly leads to the idea that national identity is similarly exclusive of that same
component. In other words: two years before the Citizenship Amendment Bill, Muslims
were thus quite explicitly warned that they had no claim over India’s past nor any right
to an Indian identity.  Interestingly,  an altogether different  picture emerges from a
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cross-examination of the program’s official lists of potential sites for adoption, of sites
currently under adoption, and of sites adopted through the signature of MoUs.
 
Table 2: Typology of the sites selected for the Adopt a Heritage Scheme
Sources: https://www.adoptaheritage.in/pdf/indicative_list.pdf (“list of potential sites for adoption”); 
https://www.adoptaheritage.in/pdf/list_of_adopted_sites_2017.pdf (“list of sites opted till date”); 
https://www.adoptaheritage.in/mou.html (“list of MoUs signed under Adopt a Heritage project”)
14 According to the above typological chart,  not only do Islamic architectural artifacts
represent  a  quarter  of  the  sites  put  up  for  adoption,  which  signals  a  blatant
contradiction  between  the  program’s  marketing  and  its  concretization.  But  Islamic
heritage sites also appear to be proportionally more coveted than Hindu vestiges in the
eyes of the above-mentioned “Monument Mitras”: whereas 66% of the former are being
(or have been) brought under the neo-liberal  care of  private corporations,  the rate
drops to 40% in the case of the latter. How is one to interpret these empirical data? Are
they the result of a conscious policy on the part of the “seller”-auctioneer, and do they
indicate that the Indian state, as governed by the BJP, is more amenable to privatizing
Indo-Islamic  monuments  than  Hindu  ones?  If  so,  such  a  policy  would  be  in  direct
contradiction to the AAH marketing strategy outlined above. Another possibility is that
these data rather reflect  the inclinations of  the “buyers” (the “Monument Mitras”)
who,  for  reasons that  remain to be explored,  seem to proportionately consider the
adoption of an Indo-Islamic architectural artifact more desirable or profitable than that
of  a  Hindu  one.  Whatever  may  be  the  case,  one  important  contrast  needs  to  be
emphasized at this point of the essay. When the BJP government devises new public-
funded programs of heritage preservation and promotion, not a paisa goes to Indo-
Muslim historical buildings.12 But when it comes to privatizing heritage conservation
and management, these same Indo-Muslim artifacts are in the front line even though
this is not something the Hindu right seems willing to publicize. 
15 However,  as  hinted above in  the introduction,  BJP heritage policies  are  not  geared
towards  the  sole  preservation  of  the  material  past.  Despite  the  central  role  Indian
history has been playing in Hindutva ideology ever since its  inception (see e.g.  the
article by Audrey Truschke in this volume), it is as if, in a sense, the past—as incarnated
by historical  buildings—was not enough and therefore had to be supplemented and
ruthlessly edited through the creation of new heritage artifacts.13 The next section of
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the article examines in this light a series of colossal statues and Disney-like projects
that have recently been popping up throughout India.
 
Enlarge your heritage?
16 Starting in the late 1990s when the BJP took control of the central government for the
first time with Atal Bihari Vajpayee (d. 2018) as Prime Minister, a mania for ever taller
statues celebrating Hindu historical and mythical figures has been fast spreading across
India.  Among the dozen examples I  have been able to identify so far,14 half  call  for
special attention because the funding for their conception and construction relies—
partially or entirely—on public money. These six monumental projects are summarized
in the table below for the readers’ convenience.15
 
Table 3: Six Hindutva colossi
Sources: Talbot (2016:2–3 and 262–266) (Prithviraj Chauhan memorials); https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Statue_of_Unity, BBC News Staff (2018) (Sardar Patel’s statue); https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Shiv_Smarak, Jain (2016), Chatterjee (2019) (Shivaji memorial); Arnimesh (2020) (Rama’s statue); 
http://kishkindha.org/statue-of-devotion/, Swamy (2020) (Hanuman’s statue).
 
Heritage Politics and Policies in Hindu Rashtra
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
7








Heritage Politics and Policies in Hindu Rashtra
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
8
Figure 5: Sardar Patel statue in Gujarat, © Vijay B. Barot
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statue_of_Unity#/media/File:Statue_of_Unity.jpg 
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17 In contradistinction to what the AAH privatizing scheme and the structurally under-
staffed and under-funded ASI might suggest, these six statues first indicate that state
finances for heritage are not that scarce. As a matter of fact, the known cumulated
funds allocated to  the building of  these structures  (9,100 crores)  amount to  almost
twice the sum that has been granted to the SDS since 2015 (5,895 crores) and, more
crucially, nine fold the 2020-2021 budget of the Archeological Survey of India (1,246
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crores16). If one is to judge by the quantity of public money spent, it would then appear
that,  in  the  eyes  of  the  BJP’s  leaders,  heritage  is  about  the  creation  of  Hindutva-
glorifying monumental artifacts rather than about the preservation (however biased)
of India’s archaeological and historical sites. 
18 The Hindutva character of these newly built or in the making structures is evidenced
by two elements. One is the identity of their patrons, that is to say those individuals or
institutions who initially commissioned the effigies and provided the necessary funding
for the concretization of the projects (including the acquisition of the land selected as
construction  site).  With  the  partial  exception  of  the  Mumbai  Shiv  smarak  (Shivaji
memorial)  whose  history  is  admittedly  more  sinuous,17 every  one  of  the  above-
mentioned monuments has been conceived and financed by figures associated to the
Sangh Parivar. Prithviraj’s memorial park in Ajmer was created at a time when the
government of the Rajasthan state was controlled by the BJP, while the Delhi Qila Rai
Pithora  Park  was  built  under  the  aegis  of  Jagmohan  during  his  mandate  as  a  BJP
Member of Parliament for Delhi and his successive tenures as Union Cabinet Minister of
Urban Development and for Tourism and Culture in the Vajpayee government (Talbot
2016:2–3 and 262–266). Sardar Patel’s Gujarat statue and the planned colossal Rama of
Ayodhya are, for their part, well known pet projects of two leading figures of the BJP,
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Chief Minister of UP, Yogi Adityanath,
respectively (see e.g. BBC News Staff 2018 and Arnimesh 2020). The case of the latest
offspring of the present statuary frenzy is slightly different since its commissioner is a
private trust affiliated to the RSS; however, the fact that this organization was able to
enlist  the BJP  government  of  Karnataka  to  financially  support  the  project  fully
legitimates its inclusion here.18 
19 The second Hindutva-marker of these statues is the particular subsets of the Indian
past  and  culture  they  purposely  emphasize.  Let  us  first  take  a  look  at  the  three
historical  figures  they  showcase.  Beyond  their  Hindu  identity,  the  twelfth-century
Rajput  petty  king  Prithviraj  Chauhan  (d. 1192),  the  seventeenth-century  Maratha
warlord  Shivaji  (d. 1680)  and  the  twentieth-century  Congress  leader  and  freedom
fighter Sardar Patel are deemed worthy of monumentalization because they represent,
in the eyes of Hindu rightists, successive and dramatic moments of Hindus’ supposed
multi-secular  fight  against  foreign  invaders.  Whereas  Prithviraj’s  and  Shivaji’s
recasting as Hindu heroes fighting the Muslim barbarians and oppressors (Ghurid and
Mughal  rulers)  can be traced back to nineteenth-century nationalist  historiography
(Talbot 2016 and Laine 2003), Patel’s appropriation by the Hindu right is a much more
recent and paradoxical phenomenon. Unlike Prithviraj and Shivaji who died centuries
before the appearance of Hindutva in India’s political landscape, Patel was witness to
the emergence of the movement and staunchly opposed it (Sircar 2019). In this sense,
his attempted cooptation by N. Modi—which may be explained by a mixture of regional
electioneering reasons and the will  to make up for the absence of Hindutva leaders
within  the  nationalist  pantheon—is  no  less  a  bewildering  tour  de  force  than  the
fashioning  of  his  colossal  effigy  out  of—rather  than  in—India.19 The  other  figures
selected for monumentalization are two star deities of the Ramayana,  the celebrated
Sanskrit epic. As is well known, Rama and, to a lesser extent, his companion Hanuman
have long been given pride of  place within Hindutva Hinduism.20 Among the many
transformations entailed by such a “spiritual” takeover, the efforts made by the Sangh
Parivar  to  historicize  these  mythical  figures  are  of  paramount  importance  to
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understand what is at stake behind the planned building of their mammoth statues.
Echoing the edification—past and present—of “janmabhumi mandirs” or “birthplace
temples,” each effigy is to be located at the site where gods Rama and Hanuman were
supposedly  born,  in  Ayodhya  and  Hampi  respectively.  In  other  words,  what  is
happening  with  these  two  gigantic  idols  goes  far  beyond  the  above-mentioned
Hindutva hijacking of historical figures: much more disturbingly, the story they tell is
about the promotion of the sacred topography of Hinduism as India’s new historical
geography.
20 The  present  Indian  frenzy  of  giant  statue  building  inevitably  brings to  mind  the
architecture of former fascist regimes and their sculptural self-fashioning as heirs of
lost empires and golden ages, first among which Mussolini’s Italy and its nostalgia for
long  bygone  Roman  glories.  Just  like  the  majoritarian  Hindu  state  heralded  and
incarnated by the BJP is  working to establish a segregated nation-state where non-
Hindus are reduced to second-class citizens with shrinking rights,  the architectural
heritage through which it strives to achieve posterity is meant to crush—by the sheer
gigantism of its artifacts—the non-Hindu elements of India’s built landscape. In a more
vulgar way, this competition to build ever bigger also evokes a kind of phallic cockfight
between the male leaders of the Hindu right: N. Modi as Gujarat Chief Minister and
then as India’s Prime Minister, Uddhav Thackeray as Maharashtra Chief Minister, Yogi
Adityanath as Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, and B. S. Yediyurappa as Karnataka Chief
Minister. And since eighteen of the thirty-one Indian states are presently ruled by the
BJP (alone or through a coalition), the ongoing race to “build taller, feel greater” is
probably not going to stop any time soon. 
21 If the aggressive monumentality of this series of colossal statues in the making brings
to  mind fascist  Italy,  the  kind of  amenities they  include  or  will  eventually  include
(artificial lakes, gardens, exhibition halls with life-sized representations, reconstructed
sites, digital dioramas, food courts, etc.) rather conjures up Disneyland and the theme
park model that has become a global phenomenon since the 1990s. In this sense, they
partake in what Alan Bryman (2004) has called the “Disneyization of society,” a process
that,  among  others  things,  “deals  in  cultivated  nostalgia  and  in  playfulness  about
reality” (Lyon 2000:6). 
22 Like  the  fever  for  giant  statues  celebrating  Hinduness,  theme  parks  aiming  at
disseminating  Hindu  nationalist  fervor  date  back  to  the  late  1990s—the  Delhi
Akshardham Cultural  Complex (2005)  being  among the  best  known examples21—and
they are fast becoming a privileged propaganda tool in the hands of BJP leaders. In this
regard, Yogi Adityanath’s plans to expand religious tourism in Uttar Pradesh are a case
in point (on this figure, see the contribution by V. Bouillier in this volume). In July
2017, a couple of months after his election as Chief Minister and a few weeks before the
Taj  Mahal  was  excluded  from  the  state  government’s  list  of  major  attractions
(Pandey 2017), the Gorakhpur-monk-turned-politician announced his intention to have
an amusement park dedicated to Krishna built in Mathura, the presumed birthplace of
the god (Darade 2017). Since then, a “Krishna Fun Land” developed by the real estate
Braj Bhoomi Group has indeed opened in Mathura, but it does not seem to include the
grand reconstruction of  Krishna’s  life  that  was  initially  planned.22 For  Adityanath’s
attention is  currently  entirely  directed to  another project,  which was likewise  first
advertised  in  2017:  the  above-mentioned  Rama  statue,  destined  to  be  one  of  the
highlights of the larger “Navya (New) Ayodhya” scheme. Aiming at developing Ayodhya
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as a global touristic hub, the project has naturally been boosted by the Supreme Court’s
verdict in November 2019 and the ensuing first steps taken towards the construction of
a  new  Rama  temple  on  the  site  of  the  Babri  Masjid  for  which  N.  Modi  laid  the
foundation stone on August 5, 2020 (BBC News Staff 2020). In order to offer the visitor a
“holistic Indic experience,” Navya Ayodhya should house the largest theme park ever
built  in  India.  Spreading over  100 acres  on the banks of  the Saryu river  along the
Lucknow-Gorakhpur national highway, this “Eye Theme Park” will not only include the
823  feet-statue  of  Rama  but  also  lively  reconstructions  of  the  major  sites  of  the
Ramayana23 and an International Ram Katha museum24 offering depictions from Rama’s
“life” in addition to the digital museum and interpretation center situated underneath
the giant idol (Sharma 2019). Today however, despite repeated official announcements
and the wide media coverage it has been receiving since 2017, the New Ayodhya’s “Eye
Theme Park,” which its advocates and promoters see as heralding the advent of the
long awaited “Ram Rajiya” or “Rama’s Realm,” still boils down to a cascade of water
slides.  For,  just  like  the  earlier  Patel  and  Shivaji  statue  projects,  it  keeps  running
against human and natural obstacles.25 After a failed attempt in Meerpur Duaba, the UP
administration decided in 2019 to relocate the construction site  in the neighboring
district of Manja Barhata but it  is  meeting with little success there too:  while local
villagers and farmers are opposing land acquisition by the state, the district magistrate
Anuj Kumar Jha has recently (January 2020) banned the construction process due to
environmental non-conformity.26 
23 Despite the grotesque character of the recent Hindutva heritage creative outburst and
the irresistible irony underpinning its  above presentation,  one should certainly not
underestimate the potential impact of these artifacts on their targeted audience, i.e.
Hindu tourists  and pilgrims from India or the diaspora.  Once lured into such post-
secular circuses and exposed to Hindutva soft power, there is a good chance that the
still  hesitant among the visitors will  eventually embrace the Hindu Rashtra project,
whether consciously or not. In this respect, the BJP’s Disney-like heritage architecture
appears no less dangerous than the darkest side of the Hindu right’s heritage policy
aiming at the obliteration of India’s non-Hindu heritage: at the very least, it contributes
to  the  acceptation  and  acceptability  of  the  growing violence  perpetrated  against
Islamic monuments and Indian Muslims; at worst, it may trigger participation in such
acts.
 
Memoricide27 under way: Indo-Muslim built landscape
in Hindu Rashtra 
24 Ever since its inception in the 1920s, the Hindu nationalist movement has placed South
Asian Muslims and the Indo-Muslim past at the top of its hate list. To a far greater
degree than Christians and the British Raj,  they have come to embody the ultimate
Other and been made responsible for the centuries-long eclipse of the once glorious
civilization of ancient India. Although the Sangh Parivar’s anti-Muslim stance and the
violence  committed  against  Indo-Muslim  individuals  and  monumental  artifacts  is
probably the one aspect of the ethno-religious populist movement that has received the
widest media coverage and the greatest scholarly attention, these recurrent assaults
bear  repetition here,  as  do  the  most  salient  features  of  the  process  of  obliteration
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underpinning them. For the sake of concision, these attacks may be summarized as
taking part in a two-pronged strategy-turned-policy. 
25 The first (and harder) prong is about mythicizing, to mystify in order to lay claim over
and eventually (in a growing number of cases) destroy Indo-Muslim built architecture.
The Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhumi dispute is the best known example of such tactics
and  of  their  successful  outcome.  Although  no  archeological  or  historical  evidence
documents  the  role  of  present-day  Ayodhya  (Uttar  Pradesh)  as  a  Hindu  center  of
pilgrimage  before  the  early  modern  period  (Bakker 1982),  Hindutva  ideologues  and
aficionados have long held that god Rama was a native of the city and that a temple had
stood at the exact location of his birth until it was destroyed in the sixteenth century
by the accursed Mughals who built in its stead a mosque erroneously known as the
Babri Masjid.28 In the 1980s, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP, or World Hindu Council)
and other Hindu nationalist groups and political parties (including the BJP) launched a
massive campaign to avenge this  invented act  of  iconoclasm and to erect  a  temple
dedicated  to  Rama  on  the  contended  site.  The  movement  first  climaxed  in  early
December 1992 when a huge mob of kar sevaks (“temple volunteers”) razed the mosque
to the ground which, in turn, triggered a wave of communal riots across India and
resulted in the death of over 2,000 people, mainly Muslims. A second acme was reached
on November 9, 2019 when the Indian Supreme Court returned its long-awaited verdict
on the dispute: although it admitted that there was no hard evidence of a preexistent
temple and that the destruction of the Babri Masjid had been an illegal coup de force, it
still  awarded the site to a government-appointed trust (the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi
Teerth Kshetra, founded in February 2020) under whose authority a “new” Ram Mandir
is currently being built. Not only did the judgment amount to a symbolic reenactment
of  the  1992  demolition;  it  also  set  a  lethal  precedent  legitimating  the  use  of
“extrajudicial violence as an acceptable means of changing the built landscape of India”
(Truschke 2020). In other words, ethno-religious terrorism is fast becoming an official
tool for the management of dissonant heritage under the rule of the BJP. 
26 As a matter of fact, a number of Hindu nationalist groups are already on the move to
capitalize on the breach caused by the verdict, especially with regard to the 1991 Places
of Worship Act.29 Unsurprisingly, the BJP is leading the way. In the week following the
judgment, C. T. Ravi,  the then Karnataka minister of tourism, declared that the BJP
government of the state was gearing up to find an out-of-court solution to the Baba
Budangiri  dargah-Dattatreya  peetha dispute  (Yogesh 2019).  In  March 2020,  while  the
COVID-19 pandemic was descending upon India, the Akhil Bharatiya Sant Samiti, an
umbrella  body  of  Hindu  seers,  announced  its  determination  to  free  “the  Kashi
Viswanath  temple  from  the  stranglehold  of  the  Gyanvapi  mosque”  in  Banaras
(Tripathi 2020).  A  few  months  later,  in  June,  the  Vishwa  Bhadra  Pujari  Purohit
Mahasangh, a Lucknow-based association of Hindu priests, openly challenged the 1991
Places of Worship Act in order to liberate the Shahi Idgah mosque of Mathura (as well
as the Gyanvapi Masjid) on the lines of the Ram Janmabhumi movement (Nair 2020).30
Following on the heels of these recently created or relatively minor organizations, the
much more prominent Hindu Mahasabha heartily embraced their claims and called out
Indian Muslims to hand over the Banaras and Mathura mosques as “a message of peace
to the world” (Awashthi 2020). Neither the fact that the influential VHP and RSS have
so far refrained from officially supporting such demands nor the recent rejection by
the Mathura court of yet another petition seeking the eradication of the Shahi Idgah
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mosque offer any reassurance as regards the prospect of these minor early modern
Islamic shrines (Chatuverdi 2020). 
27 To  a  limited  extent,  this  plight  may  be  contrasted  with  the  situation  of  the
masterpieces of Indo-Muslim architecture, best known among them those that were
built during the Mughal period. If none is in imminent danger of annihilation yet, a
number of them are nonetheless the object of a relentless process of mythicization or
de-historicization.  In  this  regard,  the  fortune  of  a  series  of  writings  penned  by
members of the Institute for Rewriting Indian History is a case in point. Starting in the
mid-1960s,  Purushottam  Nagesh  Oak  and  Hansraj  Bhatia  published  various  essays
claiming that a whole array of Mughal monuments (from the Taj Mahal to Fatehpur
Sikri, including the palace-fortresses of Agra and Delhi) were actually the product of
earlier Hindu patronage and had formerly been the sites of temples or Rajput palaces
(Oak 1965 and 1976; Bhatia 1969 and 1971). Despite the fact that neither Oak nor Bhatia
provided the slightest shred of hard evidence to support such allegations and that their
books were published at the author’s expense or by minor presses half a century ago,
the  myths  they  forged  have  since  then  enjoyed  a  far  wider  circulation  than  any
academic  monograph  on  Mughal  architecture  thanks  to  “a  massive  network  of
electronic and paper publications” orchestrated by the Sangh Parivar (Asher 2009:21). 
28 With  the  BJP’s  2014  victory  at  the  general  elections  and  its  taking  control  of  an
increasing number of states, this process of de-historicization coupled with vilification
is  logically  gaining  momentum.  Not  only  are  these  fanciful  tales  on  the  verge  of
becoming a new received wisdom thanks to the official support they regularly receive
from BJP Members of Parliament such as Laxmikant Bajpai and Vinay Katiyar; they also
have started to fuel concrete political actions such as the above-mentioned exclusion of
the  Taj  Mahal  from  the  UP’s  official  touristic  brochure  in  2017  (Beaty 2018).  Even
though  the  latter  act  may  seem  trifling  compared  to  the  sacking  of  the  Mughal
mausoleum  by  a  VHP  mob  in  2018  (not  to  mention  its  complete  annihilation  as
presaged by Prayaag Akbar’s novel Leila and its adaptation by Deepa Mehta as a Netflix
series),  it  is  worth  pondering  on  this  episode  and  its  significance  for  at  least  two
reasons. 
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Figure 9: The annihilation of the Taj Mahal as anticipated by Leila, S01E02
Source: https://moviemahal.net/2020/07/30/leila-dir-deepa-mehta-2019-india/
29 First, because it is an official decision sanctioned by a local BJP government, and not
some kind of excess committed by presumably out-of-control right-wing zealots from
which Modi’s party could therefore easily dissociate itself.  In the perspective of the
present  essay,  the  Taj  Mahal’s  disappearance  from  the  UP  booklet  is  all  the  more
significant because it perfectly illustrates the second, and deceitfully softer, prong of
the  Hindutva  strategy-cum-policy  towards  Indo-Muslim  built  landscape:  immaterial
destruction through marginalization, if not outright invisibilization.
30 Several variations or subsets of this decades-long process may be identified, and some
have already been hinted at above. It is the case with the aforementioned frenzy for
building  statues  and  theme  parks  celebrating  the  eternal  glory  of  Hinduness:  the
peppering  of  Indian  public  (especially  urban)  space  with  such  artifacts  inevitably
results in the physical marginalization of the Indo-Muslim component of the national
built  landscape.  It  is  also  a  much safer  path to  follow where  (international)  public
opinion is concerned for, however fiercely it may be criticized, it generally eludes the
opprobrium cast on iconoclastic violence, especially when the latter threatens UNESCO
World Heritage Sites. 
31 Another  potent  spatial  manifestation  of  the  re-Hinduization  orchestrated  by  the
promoters of Hindu Rasthra has to do with names, particularly with toponyms.31 As is
well known, (re)naming a place is at once a cosmological act for the one who performs
it and an identity marker for those who afterwards live in or research that same place.
Like most imperial regimes in the past (including the Mughals), it is therefore hardly
surprising that the representatives of the political branch of the Sangh Parivar have set
about refashioning India’s toponymy. Echoing the ongoing efforts at remodeling the
nation’s built landscape, they are working hard to remove the innumerable lexical and
semantic traces that the centuries-old presence of  Muslims has left  throughout the
country. Among the early experiments carried out in this domain, the reconstruction of
several villages in the wake of the severe earthquake that hit the district of Kachchh
(Gujarat) in January 2001 is particularly instructive. Under the supervision of N. Modi,
the then chief minister of the state of Gujarat, part of the rehabilitation was entrusted
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to the VHP, as a result of which two localities previously known as Lodai and Dudai
were  renamed  Keshav  Nagar  (Krishna’s  city)  and  Indraprastha  (Indra’s  city)
respectively  and  rebuilt  so  as  to  strictly  segregate  the  local  Hindu  and  Muslim
populations (Simpson and Corbridge 2006). However, it is only in the wake of the BJP’s
takeover of the central government in 2014 that this process of renaming has started
growing apace. In August 2015, the renaming of Aurangzeb Road in Delhi after A. P. J.
Abdul Kalam (d. 2015) (figure 10),  whose election as the eleventh president of India
(2002-2007) had been supported by the BJP, marked a momentous first step in what has
since  then  become  a  nation-wide  movement  for  replacing  Indo-Muslim  (especially
Mughal) toponyms by place-names either celebrating carefully chosen Muslim figures
(such as was the case with A. P. J. Abdul Kalam) or, to a far greater extent, restoring/
evoking the earlier Hindu designations of towns, districts and even railway stations. 
 
Figure 10: Renaming Aurangzeb Road, Delhi, 2015 
Source: https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/delhi-hc-questions-civic-body-over-renaming-
aurangzeb-road-33992
32 Among the many examples subsequent to the renaming of Aurangzeb Road (see e.g.
Daniyal 2018 and Truschke 2020 for a provisional list and critical appraisal thereof), the
latest targets an under-construction museum in Agra devoted to Mughal history and
heritage. Apparently unable to stop the project that had been approved in 2015, Yogi
Adityanath retaliated in September 2020 by naming it after the Maratha leader Shivaji
(Shaikh 2020).  In so doing,  the chief  minister  of  UP not  only added to the ongoing
Hinduization of the city that was once a nerve center of Mughal political domination
and culture.32 The statements that accompanied his decision—“How can our heroes be
Mughals?”—are yet  another threat  to  anyone bold enough to remind the people of
Hindu Rashtra that Indo-Muslim history and culture is part and parcel of today’s India,
whether they like it or not. Such rhetoric of intimidation is proving very effective, as
may be seen for instance in a recent declaration by Athar Hussain, the secretary of the
Indo-Islamic Cultural Foundation Trust constituted for the construction of Ayodhya’s
new mosque: while publicly inviting Yogi Adityanath to the inauguration ceremony of
the  public  facilities  adjoining the  shrine,  he  made clear  that  the  new Babri  Masjid
would not be named after Babur or any other Mughal figure (Khan 2020). In view of the
new heights  that  state  violence  against  Muslims  has  reached since  the  BJP  central
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government revoked Kashmir’s special status in August 2019, self-censorship seems to
have become the only technique of self-defense available to Indian Muslims and it will
most likely spread among non-Hindus in proportion to the memoricide under way.
33 May the latter not swell into genocide. For, if it is the special duty of historians to keep
alive the memory of the past, to record and rectify its multiple distortions, resurrecting
the dead is definitely out of their reach.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arnimesh, Shanker. 2020. “3 Years On, Yogi Govt yet to Acquire Land in Ayodhya for ‘World’s
Tallest’ Ram Statue.” The Print, July 30. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://theprint.in/
india/3-years-on-yogi-govt-yet-to-acquire-land-in-ayodhya-for-worlds-tallest-ram-statue/
470643/). 
Asher, Catherine B. 2009. “Belief and Contestation in India: The Case of the Taj Mahal.” Keynote
address to the ASIANetwork Conference in Lisle, Illinois, March. Retrieved on November 9, 2020
(https://asianetworkexchange.org/articles/10.16995/ane.212/galley/293/download). 
Ashworth, Gregory J. and J. E. Tunbridge. 1996. Dissonant Heritage. The Management of the Past as a
Resource in Conflict. Chichester: Wiley.
Awashthi, Puja. 2020. “Hindu Mahasabha wants Kashi, Mathura to be Handed Over in the Name of
‘Peace’.” The Week, June 17. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://www.theweek.in/news/india/
2020/06/17/hindu-mahasabha-wants-kashi-mathura-to-be-handed-over-in-name-of-
peace.html). 
Bakker, Hans. 1982. “The Rise of Ayodhyā as a Place of Pilgrimage.” Indo-Iranian Journal 24(2):103–
26.
BBC News Staff. 2020. “India PM Modi Lays Foundation for Ayodhya Ram Temple amid Covid
Surge.” BBC News, August 5. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-india-53577942). 
BBC News Staff. 2018. “India Unveils the World’s Tallest Statue.” BBC News, October 31. Retrieved
November 9, 2020 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
india-46028342#:~:text=Image%20copyright%20Getty%20Images%20The,%3B%20%24430m)
%20to%20build). 
Beaty, Katelyn. 2018. “Taj Mahal Vandalized as Hindu Nationalists Dispute Site’s Muslim Origins.”
Religion News Service, June 19. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://religionnews.com/
2018/06/19/taj-mahal-vandalized-as-hindu-nationalists-dispute-sites-muslim-origins/). 
Bhatia, Hansraj. 1971. Agra Red Fort is a Hindu Building. Delhi: Surya Prakashan. 
Bhatia, Hansraj. 1969. Fatehpur Sikri is a Hindu City. Delhi: Surya Prakashan. 
Bhatt, Jagdish. 2010. “World’s Tallest Hanuman Statue at Shimla.” The Times of India, November 4.
Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Worlds-tallest-
Hanuman-statue-at-Shimla/articleshow/6871465.cms). 
Heritage Politics and Policies in Hindu Rashtra
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
18
Brosius, Christiane. 2010. India’s Middle Class: New Forms of Urban Leisure, Consumption and
Prosperity. Delhi: Routledge.
Bryman, Alan. 2004. The Disneyization of Society. London: Sage Publications.
Chatterjee, Badri. 2019. “Maharashtra Government Stops Shivaji Memorial Construction.”
Hindustan Times, January 16. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://www.hindustantimes.com/
mumbai-news/maharashtra-government-stops-shivaji-memorial-construction/story-
nRZXjj9HRGc6bIBihog6rJ.html). 
Chatuverdi, Hemenchandra. 2020. “Mathura Court Dismisses Plea for Mosque Removal,
Petitioners to Move Higher Court.” Hindustan Times, October 1. Retrieved November 9, 2020
(https://www.hindustantimes.com/lucknow/mathura-court-dismisses-plea-for-mosque-
removal-petitioners-to-move-higher-court/story-h74NhtF5RK2KzFOkLKK8eP.html). 
Copeman, Jacob and Veena Das (ed.). 2015. On Names in South Asia: Iteration, (Im)propriety and
Dissimulation. South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 12. Retrieved on November 9, 2020
(https://journals.openedition.org/samaj/3985). 
Daniyal, Shoaib. 2018. “No Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan? Implemented fully, BJP’s Hindutva
Renaming will Wipe Out a lot of India.” Scroll.in, November 20. Retrieved on November 9, 2020
(https://scroll.in/article/902177/no-hindi-hindu-hindustan-implemented-fully-bjps-hindutva-
renaming-will-wipe-out-a-lot-of-india). 
Darade, Pooja. 2017. “Uttar Pradesh: Yogi Adityanath Government Plans to Build Disneyland like
Krishna Land in Mathura.” India.com, July 16. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://
www.india.com/news/india/uttar-pradesh-yogi-adityanath-government-plans-to-build-
disneyland-like-krishna-land-in-mathura-2324255/). 
Dave, Hiral. 2018. “Behind the Making of Statue of Unity.” Hindustan Times, October 14. Retrieved
on November 9, 2020 (https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/behind-the-making-of-
statue-of-unity/story-k67YKhhZaXb68ph5Zos54M.html). 
Eaton, Richard M. 2000. “Temple Desecration and Indo-Muslim States.” Pp. 246–81 in Beyond Turk
and Hindu. Rethinking Religious Identities in Islamicate South Asia, edited by D. Gilmartin and B. B.
Lawrence. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
Frykenberg, Robert E. 2008. “Hindutva as a Political Religion: An Historical Perspective.” Pp. 178–
220 in The Sacred in Twentieth-Century Politics, edited by R. Griffin, R. Mallett and J. Tortorice. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gandhi, Supriya. 2020. “When Toppling Monuments Serves Authoritarian Ends.” Foreign Affairs,
July 13. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/
2020-07-13/when-toppling-monuments-serves-authoritarian-ends).
Jain, Bhavika. 2016. “Shivaji Memorial Money could have Helped Maharashtra Complete Key
Projects.” The Times of India, December 23. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/shivaji-memorial-money-could-have-helped-
maharashtra-complete-key-projects/articleshow/56130754.cms). 
Jain, Kajri. 2018. “Reconfiguring India’s Nationalism, One Grand Statue at a Time.” The Wire,
October 31. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://thewire.in/politics/narendra-modi-statue-
of-unity-sardar-patel). 
Kanga, Surabhi. 2017. “’Archeology Should Be Taken Out of the Corridors of the Government’:
Historian Nayanjot Lahiri on the ASI and Preserving Indian Heritage.” The Caravan, August 14.
Heritage Politics and Policies in Hindu Rashtra
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
19
Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://caravanmagazine.in/vantage/historian-nayanjot-lahiri-
asi-preserving-indian-heritage). 
Khan, Arshad Afzaal. 2020. “UP: Mosque Trust to Invite CM Yogi Adityanath for Hospital, School
Foundation.” The Times of India, August 9. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/mosque-trust-to-invite-yogi-for-hosp-school-
foundation/articleshow/77439064.cms). 
Khanna, Rajeev. 2018. “Why the Statue of Unity Hasn’t Quite Generated the Euphoria BJP
Craved.” The Wire, October 31. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://thewire.in/politics/bjp-
sardar-patel-statue-of-unity-protests). 
Kumar, Sushil. 2019. “How Modi’s Vishwanath Corridor is Laying the Ground for Another Babri
Incident.” The Caravan, April 27. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://caravanmagazine.in/
religion/how-modi-kashi-vishwanath-corridor-is-laying-the-ground-for-another-babri-incident).
Laine, James W. 2003. Shivaji. Hindu King in Islamic India. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lutgendorf, Philip. 2007. Hanuman’s Tale: The Messages of a Divine Monkey. New York: Oxford
University Press. 
Lyon, David. 2000. Jesus in Disneyland: Religion in Postmodern Times. Cambridge: Polity.
Meskell, Lynn. 2020. “Toilets First, Temples Second: Adopting Heritage in Neoliberal India.” 
International Journal of Heritage Studies. Retrieved August 20, 2020 (https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/13527258.2020.1780464).
Nair, Preetha. 2020. “Kashi, Mathura Next? A Petition in SC Against Place of Worship Act 1991
Sparks Fears of Ayodhya Replay.” Outlook, August 17. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://
magazine.outlookindia.com/story/india-news-kashi-mathura-next-target-a-petition-in-sc-
against-place-of-worship-act-1991-sparks-fears-of-replay-of-ayodhya/303526). 
Oak, Purushottam Nagesh. 1976. Delhi’s Fort is Hindu Lalkot. Bombay: Jaico Publishing House.
Oak, Purushottam Nagesh. 1965. Taj Mahal was a Rajput Palace. New Delhi: The Author.
Pandey, Alok. 2017. “New Slight for Taj Mahal from Yogi Adityanath’s Administration.” NDTV,
October 2. Retrieved on November 9, 2020 (https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/taj-mahal-
blacked-out-of-up-governments-list-of-major-attractions-1757652). 
Pati, Sushmita. 2019. “Building ‘Monuments’ in a World Class City: Aesthetics and Politics in
Contemporary Delhi.” Pp. 329–51 in India and its Visual Cultures: Community, Class and Gender in a
Symbolic Landscape, edited by U. Skoda and B. Lettmann. Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Pati, Sushmita. 2014. “Jagmohan: The Master Planner and the ‘Rebuilding’ of Delhi.” Economic and
Political Weekly 49(36):48–54.
Rajagopalan, Mrinalini. 2011. “Postsecular Urbanisms: Situating Delhi within the Rhetorical
Landscape of Hindutva.” Pp. 257–82 in The Fundamentalist City? Religiosity and the Remaking of Urban
Space, edited by N. AlSayyad and M. Massoumi. Abingdon: Routledge.
Roy, Namita and Ulrike Gretzel. 2020. “Themed Route Marketing in India.” Anatolia: An
International Journal of Tourism and Hospitality Research 31(2). Retrieved September 7, 2020 (https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13032917.2020.1747222). 
S., Yogesh. 2019. “Baba Budangiri: BJP to Attempt Out-of-Court Settlement?” Newsclick, November
13. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://www.newsclick.in/Baba-Budangiri-BJP-Attempt-Out-of-
Court-Settlement). 
Heritage Politics and Policies in Hindu Rashtra
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
20
Sankaran, P. N. 2019. “CSR Interventions in India under State Invitation: An Artisans’ Perspective
on ‘Adopt a Heritage’ Programme.” Pp. 29–51 in The Components of Sustainable Development:
Engagement and Partnership, edited by D. Crowther and S. Seifi. Singapore: Springer. 
Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. 1969 [1923]. Hindutva. Who is a Hindu? Bombay: Veer Savarkar
Prakashan.
Sayeed, Vikhar Ahmed. 2018. “Bababudangiri. A Battlefront in the South.” Frontline, March 2.
Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/a-battlefront-in-the-
south/article10074157.ece). 
Scroll.in Staff. 2017. “Watch: Narendra Modi Unveils Controversial 112-foot Shiva Statue at Isha
Foundation.” February, 24. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://scroll.in/latest/830219/
protestors-urge-narendra-modi-not-to-unveil-controversial-112-foot-shiva-statue-at-isha-
foundation). 
Shaikh, Zeeshan. 2020. “Explained: 700-plus Places in India that Bear the Names of Mughals
Today.” The Indian Express, September 17. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://
indianexpress.com/article/explained/mughal-museum-agra-uttar-pradesh-yogi-adityanath-
chhatrapati-shivaji-maharaj-6596770/). 
Sharma, Aman. 2019 “Yogi’s Ayodhya’s Plans: A Shabri Garden, Ashok Vatika, Ram Setu and First




Simpson, Edward and Stuart Corbridge. 2006. “The Geography of Things That May Become
Memories: The 2001 Earthquake in Kachchh-Gujarat and the Politics of Rehabilitation in the
Prememorial era.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96(3):566–85. 
Sircar, Jawhar. 2019. “Why the BJP Feels It has to Appropriate Sardar Patel.” The Wire, October 31.
Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://thewire.in/history/bjp-sardar-vallabhbhai-patel). 
Speziale, Fabrizio and Audrey Truschke. 2019. “Rediscovering Forgotten Indo-Persian Works on
Hindu-Muslim Encounters.” The Wire, May 12. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://thewire.in/
history/india-persia-manuscripts-hindu-muslim).
Srivastava, Sanjay. 2011. “Urban Spaces, Disney-divinity and the Moral Middle Classes in Delhi.”
Pp. 364–90 in Elite and Every Man. The Cultural Politics of the Indian Middle Classes, edited by A.
Baviskar and R. Ray. Delhi: Routledge.
Swamy, Rohini. 2020. “Private Trust in Karnataka to Erect 215m Statue of Hanuman in Hampi at
Cost of Rs 1,200 cr.” The Print, August 6. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://theprint.in/india/
private-trust-in-karnataka-to-erect-215-m-statue-of-hanuman-in-hampi-at-cost-of-rs-1200-cr/
476164/). 
Talbot, Cynthia. 2016. The Last Hindu Emperor. Prithviraj Chauhan and the Indian Past, 1200-2000.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tere, Tushar. 2019. “Seaplane for Statue of Unity to Cost Hundreds of Crocodiles their Homes.” 
The Times of India, January 25. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
city/vadodara/seaplane-for-statue-of-unity-to-cost-hundreds-of-crocodiles-their-home/
articleshow/67688159.cms). 
Heritage Politics and Policies in Hindu Rashtra
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 24/25 | 2020
21
The Hindu Staff. 2014. “India’s tallest Hanuman statue to be ready by May 2015.” The Hindu,
January 2. Retrieved November 9, 2020 (https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-
pradesh/indias-tallest-hanuman-statue-to-be-ready-by-may-2015/article5529673.ece).
Tratnjek, Bénédicte. 2012. “Mémoricides dans les espaces post-yougoslaves: de la destruction de
la mémoire à la ré-écriture d’une mémoire excluante.” Pp. 215–38 in Guerre, mémoire, identité,
edited by G. Cattanéo. Paris: Nuvis.
Tripathi, Purnima. 2020. “Over to Kashi.” Frontline, March 13. Retrieved November 9, 2020
(https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/communalism/article30912569.ece). 
Truschke, Audrey. 2020. “Exclusion, Affect and Violence in the Many Sites of Indian History.” 
Indian Cultural Forum. June 9. Retrieved August 20, 2020 (https://indianculturalforum.in/
2020/06/09/exclusion-violence-indian-history-constitution-truschke/).
Venugopal, Vasugha. 2019. “Culture Ministry Charts out Rs 27,000 Crore Plan.” The Economic




1. Full  text  of  the  MoU  is  available  at:  https://www.adoptaheritage.in/moupdf/
Red%20%20Fort%20MoU.pdf 
2. As part of the Indian numbering system, the terms lakh and crore are widely used as units of
money.  The former is  equivalent  to  the  number 100,000,  the  latter  to  ten million.  One lakh
roughly corresponds to € 1,100, one crore to € 115,000.
3. See  below  for  an  analysis  of  the  program,  and  http://swadeshdarshan.gov.in/index.php?
Theme/themeDetail/7 for details of the circuit.
4. Allahabad was  initially  known as  Prayag  (literally,  “confluence”  in  Sanskrit)  before  being
renamed Illahabad (literally,  “God’s  abode” in Persian)  by the Mughal  emperor Akbar (ruled
1556-1605).  As  aptly  noted by Truschke 2020,  the addition of  “raj”  or  “king” to  the original
Sanskrit  name of  the  city  has  therefore  more  to  do  with  present-day  fabrication  than  with
resurrection of a supposedly pristine past.
5. For  a  detailed presentation of  the  scheme,  see  the  official  guidelines  available  at:  http://
swadeshdarshan.gov.in/index.php?page/guidelines.  In  tourist  marketing  parlance,  “themed
routes or tourist circuits connect two or more destinations or products under a unified theme to
create a distinct experience for the traveler” (Roy and Gretzel 2020:1). 
6. In  Savarkar’s (1969)  conception,  Buddhists,  Jains  and  Sikhs  also  partook  of  Hindutva
(Hinduness) and therefore qualified as Hindus. The term “Hindu” is used accordingly throughout
the present essay, while “non-Hindus” refer primarily to Muslims and secondarily to Christians.
7. http://swadeshdarshan.gov.in/index.php?Theme/themeDetail/19
8. The eight sites that I  have identified are:  Qutb Shahi Heritage Park,  Paigah Tombs,  Hayat
Bakshi Mosque, Nishat Bagh, Shalimar Bagh, Mir Miran Tomb, Sadna Kasai Tomb, Sher Shah Suri
Chowk on Srihind Morinda Road.
9. On Jagmohan, see Pati 2014. Nayanjot Lahiri also credits him with removing all  the illegal
occupation in and around Humayun’s tomb in Delhi during the years-long restoration of the
Mughal site by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (Kanga 2017).
10. For two recent detailed presentations and critical appraisals of the scheme, see Sankaran
2019 and Meskell 2020.
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11. https://www.groupefdj.com/fr/mission-patrimoine.html.  For  other  recent  European
examples of privately funded restorations of national monuments, see Meskell (2020:11).
12. A similar point could be made where the preservation and digitization of manuscripts is
concerned. Within the National Mission for Manuscripts established in 2003 under the aegis of
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Urdu manuscripts are hardly acknowledged. By way of example, the latter represent only 5% (9
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mission:  https://www.namami.gov.in/treasures-india.  For  a  telling description of  the  travails
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also Speziale and Truschke 2019.
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(Duke University Press 2021). Lack of time has unfortunately prevented me from including other
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conception:  1)  Hanuman  statue  at  Paritala  Anjaneya  temple  (Andhra  Pradesh,  155  feet),
completed  in  2003  (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paritala_Anjaneya_Temple);  2)  Hanuman
statue  at  Karol  Bagh  (108  feet,  Delhi),  completed  in  2005  (Pati 2019);  3)  Hanuman  statue  at
Madapam (Andra Pradesh, 176 feet), in progress since 2005 (The Hindu Staff 2014); 4) Hanuman
statue at Shimla (Himachal Pradesh, 108 feet), completed in 2010 (Bhatt 2010); 5) statue of Shiva
as Adiyogi at the Coimbatore Isha Yoga Center (Tamil Nadu, 112 feet), completed in 2017 (Scroll.in
Staff 2017);  6)  statue of  Ramanuja  (an eleventh-century Hindu thinker  known for  advocating
Vaishnava  bhakti)  at  Hyderabad  (Telengana,  216  feet),  completed  in  2018  (https://
statueofequality.org/).
16. Source: https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/sbe17.xlsx. In September 2019, the Ministry
of Culture submitted a Rs. 27,000 crores five-year plan for developing India’s “cultural capital,” a
quarter of which was supposed to be kept aside for the ASI, thus increasing its budget to Rs 6,769
crores (Venugopal 2019). Whether or not the Fifteenth Finance Commission approved of the plan,
it had no impact on the 2020-2021 budget of the ASI nor is any trace of it to be found on its
official website (last consulted September 2020).
17. The Shiv Smarak was originally planned in 2004 by the government of Maharashtra, that was
led at the time by an Indian Congress-Nationalist Congress Party coalition (1999-2014). When the
state passed into the allied hands of the BJP and the right-wing Marathi Shiv Sena in 2014, the
project received increased support (the initial Rs 100 crores-budget swelled to 3,800 crores in
2016 before being cut down to 2,500 crores in 2018) and took on a truly pharaonic dimension
(Jain 2016).
18. See  http://kishkindha.org/statue-of-devotion/ for  the official  website  of  the project,  and
Swamy 2020 for a critical appraisal thereof.
19. In contravention of the “Make in India” initiative launched by N. Modi in 2014 (https://
www.makeinindia.com/home),  the bronze cladding and other elements of  Patel’s  statue were
produced in a Chinese foundry before being shipped to India (Dave 2018). Such a decision also
suggests that the BJP’s embrace of neo-liberalism far outweighs its commitment to economic
nationalism.
20. On  the  former,  see  e.g.  the  contribution  by  Audrey  Truschke  in  this  volume;  and
Frykenberg (2008), and Lutgendorf (2007) on the latter.
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21. For in-depth analyses of the complex, see especially Srivastava 2011 and Brosius 2010, with
the latter also providing an overview of similarly oriented theme parks in India.
22. http://www.krishnafunland.com/
23. Foremost among these sites are the Ashok Vatika or the garden in Sri Lanka where Sita was
held captive by the dev-king Ravana, the Shabri garden where Rama was offered fruit by a tribal
woman named Shabri,  the Ram Setu or bridge that enabled Rama to cross the Indian Ocean,
reach Ravana’s kingdom and save Sita from the latter’s clutch.
24. It is not clear whether the planned International Ram Katha museum will be a revamped
version of the eponymous institution already existing in Ayodhya or an entirely new structure.
25. See e.g. Khanna 2018 and Tere 2019 on Patel’s statue; and Chatterjee 2019 on the planned Shiv
Smarak.
26. See  Arnimesh  2020,  and  https://www.patrika.com/ayodhya-news/construction-of-eye-
theme-park-spa-in-ayodhya-banned-5620778/.
27. First coined in 1985 by Reynald Secher, a French historian of the early modern guerre de
Vendée, the term memoricide gained wider currency in relation to the Yugoslav wars (1991-2001).
Following the definition by Tratnjek 2012,  memoricide here refers  to  the destruction of  any
spatial trace of memory, i.e. sites and places infused with a memory symbolism that impacts the
way people inhabit and imagine these spaces.
28. It was completed in 1528 on the orders of one of Babur’s commandants, not the emperor
himself.
29. Decreed in the heat of the Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhumi dispute, the special provisions of
the act “prohibit conversion of any place of worship and (…) provide for the maintenance of the
religious  character  of  any  place  of  worship  as  it  existed  on  August  15,  1947”  (http://
legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/
The%20Places%20of%20Worship%20%28Special%20Provisions%29%20Act%2C%201991.pdf).
30. See Sayyid 2018 for an insightful survey of the multiple legends surrounding the figure of
Baba Budan and the decades-long controversy over the eponymous shrine. For an introduction to
the history of the Gyanvapi and the Shahi Idgah mosques that were built during the rule of the
Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) on the sites of former temples (dedicated to Shiva and
Krishna  respectively)  which  he  had  had  destroyed,  see  Eaton  2000  who  provides  a  seminal
reconsideration of temple desecration by Indo-Muslim rulers.
31. For wide-ranging reflections on names in the context of early modern and contemporary
South Asia, see the contributions gathered in Copeman and Das (ed.) 2015.
32. Agra’s Hinduization seems to have begun in the early 2000s with the installation of “several
traffic roundabouts, all of which were decorated with large statues of either Rajput or Maratha
warriors atop horses, brandishing weapons of military might” (Rajagopalan 2011:266).
ABSTRACTS
The present essay explores three inseparable facets of the BJP’s heritage ideology and practices:
the state’s reluctance to fulfil its traditional role of guardian of the nation’s built landscape and
the concomitant resort to neoliberal outsourcing strategies to fill in the gap, combined with a
strong  sectarian  bias  at  work  in  the  shrinking  state-sponsored  projects  of  patrimonial
management; a strong appetite for building new and exorbitant heritage artefacts; finally, the
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gradual obliteration of all material traces related to the plurisecular presence of Muslims in the
subcontinent through physical elimination or renaming, resulting in the growing Hinduization of
India’s public space.
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